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DECENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW IN THE ORGANIZATION FOR 
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
JAMES SALZMAN*1 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
When one thinks of international organizations whose administrative proc-
esses legal scholars should understand, the European Union and the World 
Trade Organization come to mind without a moment’s hesitation.  A bit later, 
perhaps, one might also come up with the Montreal Protocol secretariat, Codex 
Alimentarius, or the International Organization for Standardization.  It will 
probably take a good while before the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) comes to mind.  In some respects this is hardly sur-
prising, for the OECD is neither a well-known nor well-studied international 
organization (and is certainly not known as a lawmaking institution).  Located 
in Paris and best known for its research reports, the OECD has a “secret life” 
that goes well beyond that of policy analysis.  Indeed, a number of its activities 
influence domestic agency action far more than is generally realized. 
The OECD provides a wonderful example for the study of global adminis-
trative law for the simple reason that it is a hybrid organization.  Through its 
many diverse activities, the OECD shares characteristics with primarily law-
making international bodies, such as the European Union, primarily standard-
setting bodies, such as the World Health Organization, and primarily data gath-
ering and research organizations, such as the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development.  Perhaps surprisingly, there is no uniform administrative law in 
the OECD.  In managing this constellation of activities, the OECD has chosen 
largely to decentralize its administrative law down to subject-specific director-
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ates who develop administrative procedures on an ad hoc basis.  Thus, in study-
ing administrative law at the OECD, one is effectively studying multiple admin-
istrative law systems under one roof. 
This article commences with a description of the OECD.  Since the organi-
zation does not garner much attention from scholars or the public, Section II 
describes the organization’s origins and operations, and offers examples of its 
activities.  Section III then provides four case studies that examine the OECD’s 
multiple roles and how these bear on the development of the organization’s 
administrative law.  The cases range from traditional treaty-making, to consen-
sus development of standards, to quasi-judicial review of the actions of multina-
tional enterprises.  Each of these examples relies on different types of adminis-
trative mechanisms to address the core concerns of transparency, 
responsiveness, and accountability.  The concluding section builds off of these 
case studies, exploring whether administrative law safeguards should apply to 
OECD activities that, while not lawmaking themselves, exert important influ-
ence on domestic lawmaking and underscores why the OECD has adopted a 
decentralized model of administrative law. 
II 
THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
A. History of the OECD 
The predecessor to the OECD, the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC), was created in April 1948, amidst the rubble of World 
War II’s devastation.  The OEEC’s explicit charge was to administer the Mar-
shall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe.  Housed in the Chateau de la 
Muette in Paris with representatives from its founding eighteen member coun-
tries, the OEEC’s name expressed well the organization’s goals—the promotion 
of cooperation and commerce among Europe’s reconstructed economies, the 
development of a European customs union, and, ultimately, a free trade area. 
The OEEC’s initial work focused on the effective allocation of the Marshall 
Plan’s grants and credits.  With the unexpected end of Marshall Plan aid in 
1952, the OEEC remained active by directing its energies to European eco-
nomic development and thus helping lay the groundwork for the creation of the 
European Economic Community. 
With the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1957, the 
original impetus for creation of the OEEC no longer existed.  Europe now had 
a permanent institution dedicated to forging closer economic ties.  Member 
countries had found value in the common forum provided by the OEEC, how-
ever, and the Cold War’s ideological battle over centrally-controlled versus 
market economies had grown considerably colder and more hostile.  Thus, the 
OEEC member countries decided to create a new organization in its place—the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
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In keeping with its predecessor’s mandate, the OECD is foremost an eco-
nomic organization dedicated to the principles of market economies, economic 
growth, and world trade.2  The OECD’s original membership of twenty-one 
countries (the founding Western European members, the United States, Can-
ada, and key NATO allies Turkey and Iceland) has expanded to thirty today.3  
The only legal requirement for membership, apart from unanimous approval of 
existing members, is for an applicant to have a market-based economy. 
B. OECD Activities 
In comparison with other international governmental organizations (IGOs), 
the OECD remains a curious creature.  Far from being a Cold War relic, the 
OECD has developed into an amalgam of a rich man’s club, a management con-
sulting firm for governments, and a legislative body. 
The OECD is, primarily, an exclusive club whose members produce two-
thirds of the world’s goods and services.4  The OECD provides a private setting 
for wealthy industrialized governments to share experiences, identify issues of 
common concern, and coordinate domestic and international policies.  In simple 
terms, the OECD’s range of standing inter-governmental committees serves as 
useful “talking shops” for countries to share experiences, learning from one an-
other’s successes and challenges.  The OECD occupies a unique position in the 
constellation of IGOs, with membership broader than the E.U., Nordic Council, 
or NAFTA, yet much more restrictive than the U.N. or WTO, with topic cover-
 
 2. Its founding treaty mandates the organization to promote policies designed: 
(a) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of 
living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability[ ] and thus to contribute to 
the development of the world economy[;] 
(b) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in 
the process of economic development; and 
(c) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in 
accordance with international obligations. 
See Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Dec. 14, 1960, art. 
1, 14-15, 12 U.S.T. 1728.  
 3. The Member countries and dates of accessions are: Australia (1971), Austria (1961), Belgium 
(1961), Canada (1961), Czech Republic (1995), Denmark (1961), Finland (1969), France (1961), Ger-
many (1961), Greece (1961), Hungary (1996), Iceland (1961), Ireland (1961), Italy (1962), Japan (1964), 
Korea (1996), Luxembourg (1961), Mexico (1994), The Netherlands (1961), New Zealand (1973), Nor-
way (1961), Poland (1996), Portugal (1961), Slovak Republic (2000), Spain (1961), Sweden (1961), 
Switzerland (1961), Turkey (1961), United Kingdom (1961), United States (1961).  Ratification of the 
Convention of the OECD, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_ 
201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 4. http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2068050_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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age as broad as any IGO.  As a result, the OECD provides a restricted forum 
on virtually unrestricted topics.5 
The OECD also acts as a high-powered research institution.  The organiza-
tion’s more than 1,800 employees (many of whom are economists) collect data, 
monitor trends, forecast economic developments, and develop policy options 
for consideration by member countries.  The OECD’s ability to gather and syn-
thesize data on members’ policy initiatives and results provides a wealth of in-
sight concerning which types of policies work best in particular settings.  The re-
sult is over two hundred and fifty books published annually (in addition to the 
many reports that are not published).6 
Bringing together the wealthy industrialized nations in a private setting and 
providing high-powered research has led in a number of instances to negotia-
tion and adoption of international legal instruments.  Article 5 of the OECD’s 
convention provides for member countries, through the Council of Ministers, to 
take three types of legal action—Recommendations, Decisions, and agreements 
with other governmental bodies. 
Recommendations are non-binding agreements that generally represent pol-
icy advice with a strong base of support.  Member countries generally use Rec-
ommendations either as a means to influence domestic policy development, ar-
guing in their respective capitals that the OECD has endorsed a particular 
approach, or as a precursor to a Decision.  It is rare for a Recommendation to 
lead to direct changes in agency action or rulemaking.  As a recent example, in 
response to the increasing use of information technology to create new avenues 
for offshore investment for the purposes of tax avoidance and evasion, in 1998 
the OECD Council adopted “two Recommendations to improve exchange of 
information between countries—advocating the use of tax identification num-
bers and a standard magnetic format for automatic exchange of information.”7 
Decisions are binding on member countries.8  Not surprisingly, adoption of 
Decisions is less frequent than adoption of Recommendations, and the negotia-
tions are followed much more closely by member countries.  The OECD also 
 
 5. Perhaps one reason the OECD’s mandate is so broad is its lack of direct political power author-
ity, as described on the next page of text.  As Lawrence Krause and Joseph Nye have observed, it is 
sometimes said that intergovernmental organizations operate according to “the law of inverse sali-
ence”: the greater the political prominence of an issue, the less the operational autonomy of the organi-
zation.  This law is sometimes used as a reason for limiting the scope of an organization’s domain to a 
narrow range of issues that are more likely to be susceptible to technical than to broad political treat-
ment.  Lawrence B. Krause & Joseph S. Nye, Reflections on the Economics and Politics of International 
Economic Organizations, 29 INT’L ORG. 323, 335 (1975) 
 6. Books and reports must be approved by all member countries prior to derestriction and publi-
cation. http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2068050_1_1_1_1,00.html#public. 
 7. OECD Ann. Rep. (1998), http://www.oecd.org/publications/97_rep/sec_gene1.htm. 
 8. While decisions are considered binding on member states and are expected to be implemented 
at the domestic level, there is no requirement for domestic ratification.  Indeed, the OECD itself distin-
guishes between decisions and “internationally agreed instruments.”  http://www.oecd.org/about/ 
0,2337,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.  In terms of the hierarchy of international legal instru-
ments, this would place OECD decisions at a level below treaties. 
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occasionally serves as the negotiating forum for Internationally Agreed Instru-
ments.  These are essentially treaties or conventions. 
Article 6 of the OECD Convention requires consensus for adoption of Rec-
ommendations and Decisions, though members may abstain and thereby enter 
the equivalent of a reservation.  If proponents of a Recommendation or Deci-
sion face concerted opposition from even a few countries, a vote will not be 
taken until negotiation has produced a text unobjectionable to all the member 
countries.  Although Decisions are binding, it is exceedingly rare for any OECD 
Decision to provide sanctions for noncompliance. 
The OECD’s work on bribery provides a useful example of Recommenda-
tions and Decisions at work, as well as the OECD’s role as a rich man’s club 
and management consultant.  In 1975, the U.N. General Assembly adopted by 
consensus a resolution on “Measures against corrupt practices of transnational 
and other corporations, their intermediaries, and others involved.”  This led 
four years later to a draft convention on illicit payments.9  The draft convention 
was never adopted, however, because developing countries demanded adoption 
of stronger corporate codes as a precondition for their support.  It took almost 
twenty years before the OECD addressed the issue directly.  Following exten-
sive discussions amongst member countries, the OECD adopted Recommenda-
tions in 1994, 1996, and 1997 on various aspects of bribery, calling on member 
countries to combat international corruption by making bribery of foreign pub-
lic officials a crime, preventing tax deductions for bribes, prohibiting corruption 
in contracts funded by development assistance programs, and creating effective 
company rules on accounting and auditing to reveal practices of bribery.  In 
December 1997, the member countries and five non-members agreed to a Deci-
sion that made binding the steps agreed to in previous Recommendations.10  
Soon after, the U.N. adopted a declaration against bribery referring to the 
OECD and OAS Conventions and passed a code of conduct for public offi-
cials.11  This ability to reach agreement on issues that IGOs with larger member-
ship have been unable to address meaningfully is a unique strength of the 
OECD. 
In general, OECD recommendations and decisions tend to harmonize di-
verse practices, policies, and laws of its member countries.  Whether the har-
monization is generally upward or downward depends on the perspective of the 
particular member country.  In the case of bribery, for example, the series of 
OECD recommendations were generally less than required in U.S. law but 
more than required by other countries. 
 
 9. Padideh Ala’i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment 
of the Ongoing Crusade Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 877, 913 n.163 (2000) (dis-
cussing the development of U.N. Doc. E/AC.67/L.1 (1979)). 
 10. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, December 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, 4. 
 11. See generally Ala’i, supra note 9, at 910-18 (recounting the history of the influence of intergov-
ernmental organizations on the U.N.’s adoption of standards for public officials regarding bribery). 
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A last activity worth noting is less legal in nature, but likely more significant 
than recommendations or decisions: the OECD’s central role in developing 
transgovernmental networks.  Consider that the OECD’s committees, working 
groups, expert groups, and conferences bring together approximately 40,000 
government officials and experts annually.12  Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter 
goes so far as to predict that, in stark contrast to the United Nations’ constella-
tion of institutions, “[t]he next generation of international institutions is . . . 
likely to look more like the Basle Committee [composed of twelve central bank 
governors], or, more formally, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, dedicated to providing a forum for transnational problem-solving 
and the harmonization of national law.”13 
C. OECD Structure 
Decisions and recommendations are voted on by the OECD Council, the 
governing body of member country representatives that oversees the work of 
the organization and meets twice monthly, and more if necessary.  Representa-
tives to the OECD Council are ambassador-level appointments, with one repre-
sentative from each country as well as from the European Union.  The OECD’s 
productive work, however, is carried out by specialized directorates.  Each di-
rectorate is governed by a managing committee composed of representatives 
from member countries.  Committees, through a one-country one-vote process, 
determine the directorate’s work program and priorities.  Below the committees 
are divisions, groups, and ad hoc groups that oversee the more technical activi-
ties and the work program.  As an example, the Environment Directorate’s 
main committee, the Environmental Policy Committee, oversees divisions and 
working groups on waste management policy, transport, chemicals, pesticides 
and biotechnology, and other policy areas.  In all, there are approximately two 
hundred committees, working groups and expert groups, involving the com-
bined participation of thousands of senior officials from member country gov-
ernments.  Many individuals from academia, industry, and civil society partici-
pate as well, though primarily in the role of an issue-specific expert or 
consultant rather than by representing a particular constituency. 
Traditionally, the OECD has expressly avoided the hallmarks of administra-
tive law—transparency, responsiveness, and public accountability.  Meetings are 
closed to the public.  Though not voiced openly, in the view of many OECD 
country delegates, the closed-door meetings provide a welcome alternative fo-
rum to what is often viewed as the developing country-dominated and politi-
cized United Nations system.  Coupled with the consensus requirement for 
Recommendations and Decisions, the OECD has eliminated much of the acri-
mony and political grandstanding in more transparent IGOs such as the UN’s 
 
 12. Http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2068050_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 13. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 196 (1997). 
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General Assembly.  (No doubt, dealing with like-minded countries on many is-
sues is seen as a benefit by many delegates, as well.) 
Until recently, the OECD’s only formal relations with civil society have 
been in the labor area through its two nongovernmental partners—the Trade 
Union Advisory Committee (TUAC)14 and the Business Industry Advisory 
Committee (BIAC).15  As the case study about the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) illustrates,16 the institutional failure to formally consult other 
sectors of civil society fundamentally undermined the OECD’s effectiveness in 
developing global rules for investment and eventually killed the process.  Nor is 
there an accountability mechanism similar to the World Bank’s Inspection 
Panel or the International Finance Corporation’s Ombudsman that can review 
and assess the OECD’s actions. 
In some respects, this lack of administrative safeguards is not surprising.  Af-
ter all, the OECD was initially created to administer economic aid and to pro-
mote capitalism, not to promulgate standards or engage non-state actors.17  
Over time, however, while the OECD’s activities have evolved through setting 
standards, adopting guidelines, and hosting treaty negotiations, its organiza-
tional procedures have not kept pace.  The result is an organization whose ad-
ministrative safeguards are in flux—struggling over how much and what types 
of engagement with non-state actors are necessary without undermining the or-
ganization’s basic mission. 
III 
CASE STUDIES 
This article is a positive rather than a normative endeavor.  The chosen case 
studies illustrate the range of administrative law models developed by the 
OECD, as well as the development of these models over time.  The objective of 
this case analysis is to examine why particular models were chosen and how ef-
fective they have been in furthering the goals of the OECD. 
 
 14. TUAC is the formal representative of labor organizations to the OECD.  Originally created in 
1948 to provide advice to the OEEC in its implementation of the Marshall Plan, TUAC has continued 
to provide feedback from the international labor community through regular consultations with OECD 
committees, the OECD secretariat, and Member country delegates.  Based in Paris, TUAC is a free-
standing organization with affiliates from over fifty-six national trade unions in the thirty OECD 
Member countries, representing approximately sixty-six million workers. http://www.tuac.org/about/ 
cabout.htm. 
 15. The Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) was created at the time 
of the OECD’s birth in 1962.  An independent organization, BIAC is regarded by the OECD as its offi-
cial link with employers—business and industry interests.  In terms of interactions with the OECD, 
BIAC shares many of the same features as TUAC.  It holds regular consultations with the OECD se-
cretariat, committees and groups in order to provide an institutional counterbalance to the efforts of 
TUAC. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. An interesting question is why the OECD’s institutional outreach efforts to civil society only 
extended to labor and employer groups.  This is merely speculation, but a possible explanation was the 
political importance of labor parties in OECD countries in the 1950s and the prominent, formal role 
unions and employer organizations played in domestic politics. 
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The first case study presented, the failed attempt to negotiate a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (the MAI), shows clearly the price the OECD paid 
for not reaching out to civil society.  It is an important case to start with because 
the OECD’s public humiliation provided a powerful impetus for the organiza-
tion to reconsider its administrative procedures.  Institutionally, as a result of its 
bruising interactions with governments and civil society, the OECD’s percep-
tion of itself and the public’s perception of the OECD dramatically changed 
from an inward-focused niche organization to a major international player un-
der bright scrutiny from civil society. 
The second case study explores the Mutual Acceptance of Data system.  
Run by the OECD’s Chemicals Division, this has been an extremely successful 
harmonization program that effectively sets laboratory and chemical safety test 
standards on behalf of national agencies.  It provides a model of extensive en-
gagement with stakeholders that is as transparent and responsive as any rule-
setting process in the international arena. 
The third case study explores development of the Common Approaches on 
Export Credits.  Although negotiated after the MAI debacle, on its face the 
Common Approaches negotiations appear to have followed the same process.  
A closer look, however, suggests a clear understanding existed between the 
OECD secretariat and member states over the need for civil society engage-
ment and, importantly, where and when it should take place.  The last case 
looks at an interesting model for accountability—the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises.  Although in existence since 1976, the Guidelines 
were extensively revised in 2000 and now offer a fascinating international quasi-
judicial process that operates in practice at the national level. 
A. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
The past twenty years have witnessed unprecedented increases in foreign di-
rect investment (FDI).  Flows of foreign capital to developing countries dra-
matically increased in the 1990s,18 with a forty percent increase in FDI inflows 
from 1994 to 1995 alone.19  Total FDI now exceeds the value of goods in inter-
national trade by more than five-fold,20 yet, remarkably, no comprehensive 
 
 18. Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the Economic Devel-
opment of Least Developed Countries, 27 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 277 (2004).  “In the early 1990s, Poland 
experienced a forty-fold increase in inward FDI following its rapid liberalization and deregulation pro-
gram. . . .  China experienced a ten-fold increase in FDI between 1990-1995, receiving nearly $36 billion 
in 1995.  Additionally, Mexico experienced a sharp increase in FDI following the passage of NAFTA, as 
did Chile.”  Id. 
 19. Eric M. Burt, Note, Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign Di-
rect Investment in the World Trade Organization, 12 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1015, 1019 (1997). 
 20. Kenneth Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime, 29 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 373, 382 (1998). 
 21. Id.; Sol Picciotto, Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The Antinomies of the Draft 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L. ECON. L. 731, 744 (1998); Burt, supra note 19, 
at 1016. 
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agreement exists at the international legal governing FDI.21  Absent coverage in 
the GATT or other economic treaties, the international legal framework gov-
erning FDI has developed in a piecemeal, incremental approach through a 
broad network of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).  Mirroring the growth of 
FDI, the number of BITs has dramatically increased, as well.  From 1989 to 
1995, more BITs were negotiated to completion than during the previous three 
decades.22  By 1995, over nine hundred BITs had been signed between more 
than one hundred and fifty nations.23  BITs both establish and clarify the rights 
of foreign investors.  Most BITs share the same basic protections—national 
treatment, most favored nation (MFN) treatment, prohibition of exchange con-
trols, prohibition of uncompensated expropriation, and resolution of disputes 
by binding arbitration.24  One important limitation of BITs is that they have not 
addressed linkages with other fields.25 
If the only concerns raised by FDI were expropriation of property and re-
payment of debts, this lack of linkages would make good sense.  But FDI, in 
practice, can have a direct relation to labor, environmental and other social wel-
fare concerns because the goals of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and host 
countries may conflict.26 
The fragmented nature of BITs encouraged a number of countries to seek to 
harmonize the patchwork of BITs through an MAI during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations leading to the creation of the World Trade Organization. The 
United States and others had proposed a comprehensive investment agreement 
but faced concerted opposition from developing countries.27  Against this back-
drop of failure, in the early 1990s the OECD’s Committee on International In-
vestment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) commenced a research project 
known as the Wider Investment Instrument Project.  The OECD member coun-
tries sought to bring order to the proliferation of FDI and BITs through an 
agreement that consolidated the many BITs in an MAI.  Following the comple-
tion of over seventy preparatory studies, in 1995, CIME and the Committee on 
Capital Movements and Invisible Transactions (CMIT) reported to the OECD 
Council that “the foundations have now been laid for the successful negotiation 
of . . . [an MAI] building on OECD’s existing instruments and expertise.”28 
 
 22. Kenneth Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 90 A.J.I.L. 545 (1996) (book review). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Vandevelde, supra note 20, at 373 n.2. 
 25. TUAC claimed that none of the 1600 BITs address labor issues.  Interview by the author with 
TUAC personnel (December 1998). 
 26. Trying to increase employment, for example, countries have employed a range of operational 
restrictions (also known as performance requirements) such as mandating the hiring of local workers 
and limiting the ability of the company to employ foreign employees.  For this reason as well as con-
cerns over sovereignty, developing countries have preferred negotiating BITs and, with few exceptions, 
uniformly opposed strong multilateral rules liberalizing FDI under the auspices of the GATT or WTO. 
 27. The substantive reasons for this opposition are set out, infra note 34. 
 28. OECD, A Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Report by the Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME) and the Committee on Capital Movements and 
Invisible Transactions (CMIT), Paris, 1995. 
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The stated goal was to complete the treaty by May 1997.  A high-level nego-
tiating group was established with the mandate to create an agreement that 
would 
provide a broad multinational framework for international investment with high stan-
dards for the liberalisation of investment regimes and investment protection and with 
effective dispute settlement procedures; be a free-standing international treaty open to 
all OECD Members and the European Communities, and to accession by non-OECD 
Member countries.29 
From the outset, the MAI negotiations were regarded internally by the se-
cretariat as a technical harmonization exercise.  Given that there was a great 
deal in common among the many investment treaties, it was expected that the 
OECD secretariat would review the range of BIT texts, identify common fea-
tures, and create a unifying draft that would form the basis of a general agree-
ment.  The MAI, it was hoped, would be the first comprehensive international 
investment treaty creating uniform rules for FDI protection, liberalization, and 
dispute settlement.  By creating a more level playing field than the bumpy ter-
rain of BITs, the MAI would greatly reduce distortions to investment flows and 
therefore speed the growth of FDI, significantly promoting the liberalization of 
investment measures and performance requirements beyond the results of the 
Uruguay Round agreements. 
The draft MAI as originally proposed was based upon the principles of na-
tional treatment, most-favored nation treatment, and transparency.  It would 
have restrained governments from treating foreign and local investments differ-
ently than domestic investments, moving closer to a baseline of non-
discrimination.  The agreement sought to harmonize upward by creating 
mechanisms addressing standstill and rollback of investment measures.30  In-
deed, the MAI was less an attempt to regulate FDI than an effort to deregulate 
FDI flows.31 
The MAI negotiations were announced in OECD press releases, articles 
were published in the organization’s magazine, the OECD Observer, and many 
of the conference papers were posted on the OECD internet website created 
for the MAI in June 1996.  The OECD even held an early press conference to 
discuss issues concerning negotiation of the MAI, but no one showed up.  This 
confirmed CIME’s view that negotiation of the MAI was purely a technical 
 
 29. David Robertson, The MAI Affair, A Story and its Lessons, 17, available at 
http://www.cairnsgroupfarmers.org/ni/reportspapers/maipaper.pdf. 
 30. Standstill measures prohibit the introduction of additional non-conforming measures.  Roll-
back measures allow only future liberalization of measures. 
 31. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the MAI’s text in detail, but it is important to 
recognize that despite the reassurances of its proponents, the MAI did more than simply harmonize 
BITs.  For a discussion of the specific reasons behind NGO opposition, see Salzman, supra note 1, at 
824. 
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harmonization exercise and there was no public interest in the matter.32  With 
the exception of NAFTA, which is more a trade than an investment treaty, 
none of the previous BITs had ever been met with outrage or even interest by 
NGOs. 
Given this intense indifference to the MAI from the outset, why did an ef-
fective global coalition of labor, environmental, and other groups form explic-
itly against the MAI just two years later?  From the end of 1995, a small number 
of NGOs started to follow the negotiations and oppose both the goals and con-
tent of the MAI process.  At the start, these were primarily environmental and 
social, rather than labor, groups.  The OECD held an informal meeting with in-
terested NGOs in December of 1996.  The OECD was open in terms of an-
nouncing the process of the negotiations and their general status but, in keeping 
with OECD procedures, the meetings and internal documents were restricted.  
In February 1997, the group Public Citizen, founded by Ralph Nader, obtained 
a copy of the current Chairman’s draft (that is, the consolidated negotiating text 
up to that point) and posted it on the Internet.33  This posting provided the cata-
lyst for widespread, hard line NGO opposition against the MAI.34 
Many of those involved in the campaign described the NGO opposition as a 
wildfire.  Indeed, the rapidity and effectiveness of NGO opposition to the MAI 
was unprecedented.  Just two months after the initial posting, a more formal 
meeting for NGOs was hosted by members of the Negotiating Group and secre-
tariat officials.  The OECD’s first consultative meeting with interested groups 
about the MAI had been in an empty room; the October briefing, by contrast, 
attracted representatives from forty groups around the world.35  In a mere mat-
ter of months, through the internet and e-mail, a global campaign against the 
MAI had come into being.  Drafts and bulletins on the MAI were now regularly 
posted on a host of NGO websites.36  By 1998, anti-MAI campaigns were active 
in more than half of the OECD countries as well as many developing coun-
tries.37 
The global NGO campaign against the MAI rapidly achieved a powerful 
impact.  By the time the Chairman’s draft was issued in early 1998, many of 
 
 32. In a revealing anecdote on how low-profile the MAI exercise was within the OECD, a member 
of the OECD secretariat related that she was at a U.N. Commission for Sustainable Development 
meeting in 1996 when an NGO participant started denouncing the MAI negotiations.  The European 
Union delegate had to call back to Paris to ask what the MAI negotiations were.  Interviews with 
OECD personnel.  December 12, 2003. 
 33. Stephen Kobrin, The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations, 112 FOREIGN POL’Y 97, 97-98 (Fall 
1998). 
 34. NGOs criticized the legitimacy of the closed door process, but their fundamental concerns were 
substantive.  They charged that the MAI weakened the regulatory capacity of host countries in favor of 
investor protections.  Under the guise of technical harmonization, in other words, the MAI negotiations 
were imposing an undesirable policy choice with the potential to fundamentally change the status quo. 
 35. Robertson, supra note 29, at 41. 
 36. See, e.g., http://www.citizen.org/trade/issues. 
 37. Robertson, supra note 29, at 46. 
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TUAC’s initial demands had been met.  Despite earlier protestations by some 
member countries, text was inserted to prohibit the lowering of social and envi-
ronmental standards to attract FDI, to ensure that treaty obligations would not 
prevent governments from maintaining (or heightening) protective social and 
environmental standards, and to ban claims by foreign investors for compensa-
tion for losses caused by non-discriminatory regulatory actions.  These conces-
sions, however, came too late, for the NGO campaign had taken on a life of its 
own in domestic politics.  In early 1998, seeking to resurrect the chances of re-
newed Fast Track trade authority from Congress, the Clinton Administration 
sought NGO support by denouncing the MAI as “fatally flawed” and demand-
ing it be reconsidered.  Domestic opposition also flared up in Paris, where dem-
onstrations in February took aim at the impact of the MAI on France’s ability 
to protect its cultural heritage.  In response, the MAI negotiations were for-
mally suspended for a six-month period of assessment by the negotiating par-
ties.  On October 14, France, one of the MAI’s strongest early proponents, an-
nounced it would pull out of the negotiations.  France’s abandonment of the 
negotiations meant the E.U. had to follow, effectively dooming the OECD’s 
negotiation of an MAI.  Reflecting this course of events, the OECD issued a 
press release on December 3 stating that “Negotiations on the MAI are no 
longer taking place.”38 
The MAI proved to be a watershed experience for the OECD.  For the very 
first time, the OECD was the target of a high-profile NGO campaign.  Flat-
footed and caught by surprise, the OECD’s response to public criticism had 
been ineffective and, sensing the domestic political winds, governments publicly 
criticized the OECD activities for the first time, as well.  Such scrutiny was both 
unexpected and unwelcome.  Following the MAI, the challenge to the OECD 
was clear—it needed to reassess its relationships with NGOs beyond TUAC 
and BIAC in order to prevent future high-profile casualties.  This task would be 
made easier, though, by the fact that some of the other OECD directorates al-
ready had longstanding and successful mechanisms in place for engagement 
with non-state actors.  This process is further explored in Section B. 
B. Mutual Acceptance of Data 
One of the most influential OECD programs on domestic agency action has 
also been among the least known.  Since the 1980s, the Chemicals Division of 
the Environment Directorate has administered a mutual recognition system for 
the non-clinical safety data of chemicals.  Known as the Mutual Acceptance of 
Data (MAD) system, member countries and non-member countries agree to 
accept non-clinical safety data from one another.  These data are relied on by 
governments to evaluate the safety of a staggering range of products, such as 
chemicals, pesticides, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, food, feed additives and bio-
cides. 
 
 38. Id. at 17. 
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In simple terms, the MAD system ensures that chemical test results pro-
duced in one country will be accepted when an agency assesses the same chemi-
cal in another country.  Thus, in practice, governments that receive requests to 
approve the sale of industrial chemicals, pharmaceuticals, or pesticides can base 
their decisions on testing results from other countries.  This saves the chemicals 
industry the expense of repeatedly testing products for sale in different markets 
and promotes civil society concerns over data quality and transparency of test 
methodologies and lab standards.39  In an era of falling tariffs, non-tariff barriers 
to trade have become increasingly important.  The MAD system reduces the 
threat of non-tariff barriers by harmonizing safety tests and lab standards across 
the range of commercial chemicals. 
It is important to note that the MAD system addresses the safety testing of 
the chemicals, not the decision whether the chemicals are safe enough be sold 
on the market of any particular country.  In technical terms, the MAD system 
provides common risk assessment data while risk management is left to each 
member country.  The system is founded on three legally binding Council Deci-
sions.40  Thus, except for a narrow exception described below, member coun-
tries must accept test results from other participating countries.41 
All thirty OECD members participate in the MAD system—twenty-five 
have implemented the 1981 and 1989 Council Acts through national legislation 
and regulation, two are establishing monitoring programs, and the remaining 
three have not implemented the Council Decisions, but must accept data from 
other participating countries.  The system is clearly effective, for there has been 
growing interest from non-member countries.  South Africa became a full par-
ticipant in 2003; Slovenia, Israel and India are joining soon; and negotiations are 
underway with Brazil, China and the Russian Federation. 
For such a system to work, of course, the participating governments must be 
confident that the tests on the chemicals were both relevant and properly ad-
ministered.  This is ensured through the OECD Test Guidelines and Principles 
of Good Laboratory Practice (GLP).  Thus, all test data submitted to agencies 
 
 39. A study for the OECD found yearly net savings from MAD to be $54 million ($63.5 million 
savings from avoided testing, less $9.5 million in program administration.  Rob Visser, OECD Chemi-
cals Division, Personal Communication to James Salzman, Dec. 12, 2003. 
 40. The three decisions are: 
• Decision of the Council Concerning the Mutual Acceptance of Data (MAD) in the Assessment 
of Chemicals, OECD Doc. C(81)30 (May 12, 1981), with its associated Test Guidelines and 
Principles of Good Laboratory Practice (GLP); 
• Council Decision-Recommendation on Compliance with Good Laboratory Practice, OECD 
Doc. C(89)87, (Oct. 2, 1989); 
• Council Decision on the Adherence of Non-Member Countries to the Council Acts related to the 
Mutual Acceptance of Data in the Assessment of Chemicals, OECD Doc. C(97)114, (Nov. 26, 
1997). 
 41. The relevant Decision text states that “data generated in the testing of chemicals in an OECD 
Member country in accordance with OECD Test Guidelines and OECD Principles of Good Labora-
tory Practice shall be accepted in other Member countries for purposes of assessment and other uses 
relating to the protection of man and the environment.”  Decision of the Council Concerning the Mu-
tual Acceptance of Data (MAD) in the Assessment of Chemicals, Part 1(1) at 2. 
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must include a declaration by the test facility that the appropriate Test Guide-
line was followed and that the testing was carried out in accordance with GLP 
Principles. 
Approximately one hundred Test Guidelines have been developed.42  As 
their name suggests, they are basically recipes for how particular types of tests 
should be done.  If one is testing the toxicity of a chemical on aquatic organ-
isms, for example, the relevant Test Guidelines will state the type of organism 
to use (for example, daphnia), how the doses should be administered, and how 
toxicity should be measured. 
The GLP Principles focus not on the tests themselves but on the conditions 
under which the tests are carried out.  Established in 1978, three years before 
adoption of the MAD system, the GLP Principles seek to ensure the quality 
and validity of test data.  The Principles focus on the organizational processes 
and conditions under which laboratory studies are planned, performed, moni-
tored, recorded and reported.  As an example, the GLP Principles for storage 
require, among other procedures, that 
To prevent contamination or mix-ups, there should be separate rooms or areas for re-
ceipt and storage of the test and reference items, and mixing of the test items with a 
vehicle.  Storage rooms or areas for the test items should be separate from rooms or 
areas containing the test systems.  They should be adequate to preserve identity, con-
centration, purity, and stability, and ensure safe storage for hazardous substances. 43 
OECD working groups meet regularly to manage the MAD system.  These 
groups oversee publication of Consensus Documents on interpretation of the 
Principles, Guidance Documents, and Advisory Documents, all of which pro-
mote development of new standards and revision of existing ones.  In a practice 
that stands in stark contrast to how the rest of the OECD has traditionally op-
erated, the working groups actively engage industry and civil society to reach 
consensus on Testing Guidelines and GLP Principles.  This occurs both through 
participation of non-state experts at meetings and, more important, through a 
network of seven thousand experts for peer review and validation of proposed 
new Test Guidelines and updates.  This network has a broad membership, with 
participants from industry, trade unions, academia, and environmental and 
animal welfare NGOs. 
The participation of civil society NGOs not only adds scientific expertise, 
but also helps ensure that the process remains transparent.  BIAC and TUAC 
have full participation rights in the meetings, while other non-state actors par-
ticipate as observers.  To increase their voice, environmental groups are gener-
ally represented by a single member of the European Environment Bureau who 
speaks with authority on their behalf.  Seeking to achieve the same unified 
voice, in a clever strategy, animal welfare groups have formed a group known as 
 
 42. These are in the areas of physical-chemical properties, human toxicity, ecotoxicity, and degra-
dation and accumulation. 
 43. OECD Series on Principles of Good Laboratory Practice and Compliance Monitoring No. 1, 
OECD Doc. ENV/MC/CHEM(98)17, § 3.3 at 21 (1997). 
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the International Council for Animal Protection in OECD Programmes 
(ICAPO).44  ICAPO was created explicitly to participate in the GLP and Test 
Guideline working groups with an equal voice to the EEB.  Of course, the in-
terests of the NGOs these groups represent are not identical.  Environmental 
and consumer NGOs, for example, often want to increase the number of ani-
mals required per test to understand better the effects on the environment and 
human health, while animal welfare NGOs want to reduce those numbers. 
How does this process work in practice?  Hazard data of chemicals is rou-
tinely needed on skin irritation, acute toxicity, and other basic effects.  A pro-
posal for a test method can come from anyone, but it usually comes from an 
agency or industry that wants to update a test method or have a new one 
adopted.  A group of government and non-state experts considers the request 
and, if deemed worth pursuing, the proposed test is sent out for comments (as 
well as posted on the website).  If, after revisions based on the peer review 
comments, the test method is close to adoption, the proposal is sent to national 
coordinators at relevant domestic agencies.  They make the decision whether to 
approve or continue development.  If approved, the test method is sent to the 
Environment Directorate’s governing committee for approval, and then on to 
the OECD Council.  Once adopted by members, the test method has legally 
binding force as a Council Decision. 
The controversy over genetically modified organisms (GMOs) shows just 
how well this system works.  While the U.S. and Europe have recently moved 
their battle over GMOs to the WTO dispute settlement process, several years 
ago, with tempers still flaring across the Atlantic, the OECD was able to reach 
consensus among its members on how GMOs should be tested for safety.  The 
MAD system has been able to navigate the controversial animal welfare debate 
as well, developing testing methodologies using cultivated cells or tissues (the 
so-called in vitro or in silico tests).  The OECD has been able to make progress 
on such divisive issues by focusing only on the harmonization of data require-
ments for use in member countries’ regulatory processes. 
Although OECD member countries agree on many issues, there are occa-
sional fundamental disagreements.  The MAD system has successfully dealt 
with such disagreements by partitioning the technical aspects from the political. 
Thus, the contentious political decisions over whether to approve a chemical or 
product lie in the hands of regulatory agencies and are explicitly not part of the 
MAD system. 
Similar to the MAD system, the GLP system ensures harmonized standards 
for how laboratories carrying out the tests should be managed.  As part of the 
1981 OECD Decision, member governments are required to 
 
 44. ICAPO defines its mission as seeking “to promote new test guidelines [that] fully incorporate 
alternative methods that can replace, reduce, and refine animal use (the ‘Three Rs’).  Similarly, ICAPO 
will seek to limit animal use and promote alternative methods in OECD testing programs, such as the 
OECD’s emerging programs to assess ‘high production volume’ chemicals and ‘endocrine disrupting’ 
chemicals.”  http://www.hsus.org/ace/16124. 
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i) establish national procedures for monitoring compliance with GLP 
Principles, based on laboratory inspections and study audits; 
ii) designate an authority or authorities to discharge the functions re-
quired by the procedures for monitoring compliance; and 
iii) require that the management of test facilities issue a declaration, where 
applicable, that a study was carried out in accordance with GLP Princi-
ples and pursuant to any other provisions established by national legis-
lation or administrative procedures dealing with good laboratory prac-
tice. 45 
Each government is required to set up its own GLP compliance monitoring 
procedure and ensure its domestic regulatory practices are consistent with the 
OECD decision, but there is no uniform model for doing so.  For European Un-
ion countries, this is done directly through community legislation.  All OECD 
Test Guidelines and the GLP principles are transcribed directly into European 
Directives without amendment.  In all, twenty-five OECD countries have im-
plemented the 1981 and 1989 Council Acts through national legislation and 
regulation.46 
The United States has not adopted the GLP Principles and Testing Guide-
lines directly.  Although the OECD standards inform the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration’s actions, the FDA promulgates its own GLP and Testing 
Guidelines as informal rules, often going beyond what is required by the GLP.47  
The EPA has its own FIFRA and TSCA GLP Principles, for example, which 
are comparable to the OECD’s.48 
Member states are required to appoint authorities and establish procedures 
to monitor compliance with GLP Principles, including laboratory inspections 
and study audits.  Member states are also expected to exchange information 
with one another and to provide information about compliance of their national 
GLP test facilities to other member states.  Despite these requirements, in a 
small number of cases countries have refused to accept safety data for product 
evaluation, contending that they had concerns over the effectiveness of GLP 
compliance monitoring procedures in the country where the data had been gen-
erated.  This has been a particularly controversial issue for the United States.  
While the FDA generally accepts test data, in the mid-1990s it challenged E.U. 
 
 45. Decision of the Counsel concerning the Mutual Acceptance of Data (MAD) in the Assessment 
of Chemicals, OECD Doc. C(81)30(Final), Annex 2, (May 12, 1981),  available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/39/15/2017640.pdf. 
 46. Two OECD countries are currently establishing monitoring programs, and three have not yet 
implemented the Council Decisions, though they are required to accept data from the other participat-
ing countries. 
 47. Japan, too, sometimes requires additional testing (for example, a 28-day test with an added 
control beyond what is called for in the Test Method).  This is appropriate since the Council Decision 
establishes a floor, not a ceiling.  One can ask for additional tests, in other words, but not different tests. 
 48. Rob Visser, OECD Chemicals Division, Personal Communication to James Salzman, Dec. 12, 
2003 (on file with author). 
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testing on a number of occasions, demanding assurances that the declarations of 
compliance with the Test and GLP Guidelines were accurate.49 
Concerns over how adequately countries were monitoring compliance with 
GLP Principles and Test Guidelines came to a head in the late 1990s, when the 
Working Group on GLP established an informal system of evaluation.  Known 
as “mutual joint visits,” over a three-year period all thirty-four GLP compliance 
monitoring authorities were visited by three-person teams drawn from three 
other national authorities.  The visiting teams evaluated the program documen-
tation and accompanied staff on inspections and study audits.  The visit reports 
were reviewed in the Working Group, which then made recommendations on 
necessary improvements.  The reviews were informal, yet peer pressure was 
significant and apparently has been sufficient to bring about specific changes in 
program management.  When evaluated by the OECD Chemicals Committee in 
2002, it was agreed that the same procedures should be continued and extended 
to non-OECD countries in the system.  Two additional requirements are worth 
noting in this regard, as well.  Not only must authorities now circulate annual 
overviews of all inspections among themselves and study audits they carry out, 
but, when it has good reason for doing so, another member country can request 
information concerning GLP compliance of a test facility (including information 
focusing on a particular study).50 
The MAD system is truly unique among IGOs in both substance and proce-
dure.  In substantive terms, no ISO standards (or any other standards, for that 
matter) can compare in terms of regulatory acceptability to the GLP Principles 
and Test Guidelines.  In procedural terms, the system is unlike any other ad-
ministrative processes at the OECD.  International, mandatory standards are 
set, placing the OECD in the effective role of a regulator.  All meetings are 
open to non-state actors (except when GLP inspections are discussed).  All 
documents are unrestricted and free.  Decisions rely on the contributions of a 
large network of non-state experts.  The process is supported both by industry 
and civil society groups.  Compliance with standards is assured by regular site 
visits and the effective use of peer pressure.  And the system is open to non-
OECD countries (indeed, non-member participation is encouraged). 
The broad-based, inclusive MAD program stands in stark contrast to the se-
cretive and closed MAI process of engagement with civil society.  It also is 
widely regarded as a success.  Given the MAI debacle and the MAD experi-
ence, after 1997 the interesting question became whether the MAD approach 
would guide other OECD directorates in their engagement with non-state ac-
tors.  As the next section describes, the influence of both MAD and the MAI 
were significant but indirect. 
 
 49. It is worth noting that such an objection could not have been mandated in the United States 
through administrative law channels. 
 50. The group overseeing the mutual joint visits is the only Chemicals group restricted to govern-
ment officials.  This helps ensure frank and open discussion of compliance monitoring and enforcement 
weaknesses. 
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C. Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export 
Credits 
Export credit agencies (ECAs) are national agencies that offer loans, insur-
ance, and guarantees to support domestic companies’ overseas activities.  ECAs 
represent one of the largest sources of public finance, with over $500 billion of 
financing committed in 2001.51  They are major development players, as well, 
accounting by the late 1990s for over “24 percent of all developing countries’ 
debt, and 56 percent of the debt owed to official governmental agencies.”52 
While financing overseas investment has helped spur development in poor 
countries, it has also led to significant controversy, particularly when the monies 
support large infrastructure projects with major environmental impacts.  A 
high-profile project in Batu Hijau, Indonesia, for example, illustrates a typical 
conflict.  A consortium of companies, involving the United States, Japan, and 
Indonesia, operate an open pit copper and gold mine.53  Upon completion, the 
mine will have excavated three billion tons of rock, creating a pit 2,625 meters 
wide and 460 meters deep.54  NGOs charge that the mine is located in a “previ-
ously undisturbed tropical forest,” destroying local vegetation and the endan-
gered yellow-crested cockatoo’s habitat, affecting local water levels and quality, 
creating excess waste rock, and polluting the air.55  Another ECA-financed pro-
ject, the Chad–Cameroon Petroleum Pipeline, has proven equally controversial.  
The pipeline transports oil from Doba, in southern Chad, to an off-shore oil-
loading facility on Cameroon’s coast.56  Financed by the World Bank Group and 
the International Finance Corporation, as well as by Exxon-Mobil, Petronas, 
and Chevron-Texaco, the project has allegedly caused serious harm to Camer-
oon’s Atlantic littoral rainforest and the indigenous Bakola pygmies who live in 
the region.57  One could list many other ECA-supported projects in the mining, 
pulp extraction, oil, and power development sectors that face similar criticism.  
Traditionally, however, ECAs have not considered the environmental impacts 
 
 51. According to the World Bank, ECAs’ “total exposure to developing countries reached an 
estimated $500 billion at the end of 2000—one-quarter of developing countries’ long term debt.”  The 
World Bank, Global Development Finance: Financing the Poorest Countries, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Publisher, 2002), I: 107 in Globalization’s Most Perverse Secret (paper presented May 23-
24, 2002), available at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/2487_Globalizations_ 
Secret.pdf, at 5; see also http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/dynamicPDFcache/BE-Section-Issues_ 
ECA_FAQ-1110637439.pdf, at 2. 
 52. Jakarta Declaration for Reform of Official Export Credit and Investment Insurance Agencies 
(May 1-7, 2000), available at http://www.eca-watch.org/goals/jakartadec.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2005). 
 53. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Rep. No. GAO-03-1093, Export Credit Agencies, Movement 
Toward Common Environmental Guidelines, but National Differences Remain, 35-36 (Sept. 2003), 
available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d031093.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2005). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 36. (stating that in 1997 the Export-Import Bank began requiring a series of environ-
mental reviews, and that project developers seek to alleviate the environmental effects with a deep-sea 
tailings disposal system, operating a revegetation program, and initiating a study of water seepage pat-
terns). 
 56. Id. at 38-39. 
 57. Id. at 39. 
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of projects, leaving it to host governments to establish appropriate regulations 
and ensure enforcement.58 
Seeking to change this practice, a concerted NGO campaign in the 1980s fo-
cused on World Bank activities.  This contributed to the World Bank’s adoption 
of a series of internal policies and procedures to guide the Bank’s assessment 
and implementation of projects with environmental impacts.  In 1984, for ex-
ample, the Bank adopted Operational Manual Statement 2.36 on Environ-
mental Aspects of Bank Work, setting forth eight principles to guide Bank ac-
tivities.  The principles include commitments not to finance projects that “cause 
severe or irreversible environmental deterioration, including species extinction 
without mitigatory measures acceptable to the Bank” or to “finance projects 
that contravene any international environmental agreement to which the mem-
ber country concerned is a party.”59  These were followed by specific Opera-
tional Directives, Bank Procedures, and Good Practices that set out environ-
mental steps and policies Bank staff must follow in all Bank operations and 
projects.60 
In 1995, a year after the World Bank’s adoption of an environmental policy, 
the United States Export-Import (Ex-Im) Bank became the first national ECA 
to develop minimum environmental standards and evaluation procedures, enti-
tled “Environmental Procedure and Guidelines.”61  The Ex-Im Bank developed 
two types of guidelines:  quantitative or numerical guidelines to assess air emis-
sions, water quality, and noise impacts; and qualitative guidelines to assess the 
project’s ecological, economic, and cultural impacts.62  In practice, all applicants 
to the Export-Import Bank for long term transactions, including those projects 
with a principal liability of more than $10,000,000 or a repayment term of more 
than seven years, are required to prepare an “Environmental Screening Docu-
ment.”63  If the project poses potentially adverse environmental impacts, an en-
vironmental assessment may be required.64  Most transactions, though, do not 
 
 58. In the United States, for example, Ex-Im Bank funding decisions are not subject to review un-
der Executive Order 12114, requiring environmental impact reviews of actions with foreign impacts. 
 59. David Hunter, The World Bank: A Lighter Shade of Green?, in YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 2001/2002, 61  (Olav 
Schram Stokke & Øystein B. Thommessen eds., 2001), available at http://www.greenyearbook.org/ 
articles/01_06_hunter.pdf. 
 60. See generally, DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN & DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1482 (2d ed. 2002). 
 61. Environmental Review Procedures, Export-Import Bank of the U.S., 61 Fed. Reg. 17,701-01 
(Apr. 22. 1996).  For further detailes, see http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/environment/ 
envproc.html. 
 62. See Export-Import Bank of the United States, International Environmental Guidelines, Annex 
A, (May 1998, revised July 2, 2003)  at http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/environment/ 
envguide.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2005). 
 63. Export-Import Bank of the United States, Ex-Im Bank Environmental Procedures and Guide-
lines (revised July  7, 2004), at http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/environment/envproc.html (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2005). 
 64. See id. (stating what the environmental assessment should include).  See also  Export-Import 
Bank of the United States, Environmental Procedures, Introduction (revised July 2, 2003) (listing the 
categories as Category N: Nuclear, Category A: Large Greenfield Projects or Projects located in, or im-
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require a review, either because they are short-term transactions or are not en-
vironmentally sensitive.65 
Landing contracts for large foreign projects is a highly competitive business, 
and the support provided by ECAs can make or break a deal.  With mandatory 
environmental guidelines in place, the Ex-Im Bank found itself at a competitive 
disadvantage to national ECAs that did not have to meet similarly stringent 
standards.  Thus, the United States started lobbying for OECD members to 
adopt similar standards.  (The United States followed a similar route in pushing 
for a Bribery Convention at the OECD that mirrored the requirements of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.)  In 1997, for example, at the Denver G-7 Sum-
mit, the Final Communique for the Summit stated that “[g]overnments should 
help promote sustainable practices by taking environmental factors into account 
when providing financing support for investment in infrastructure and equip-
ment.”66 
The efforts of the United States to harmonize strict standards were sup-
ported by a global NGO campaign, spearheaded by ECA Watch and the Inter-
national NGO Campaign on Export Credit Agencies.  These groups called for 
“public access to information and consultation by ECAs . . . [and for] [b]inding 
common environmental and social guidelines and standards that are not lower 
and less rigorous than existing international procedures.”67 
In 1998, the OECD responded, and the Trade Committee’s Working Party 
on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (ECG) issued a “Statement of Intent 
on Export Credits and the Environment” discussing the consideration of envi-
ronmental impacts during the risk assessment stage of various projects.  A year 
later, the G-7 and OECD Ministers expressly called for development of com-
mon international standards and commenced negotiations at the OECD, and 
the OECD soon after adopted an “Action Statement,” outlining a framework 
of “Common Approaches” for ECA activities.68 
 
pacting a Sensitive Site [requires submission of an environmental assessment and related documenta-
tion describing the environmental effects of the project], Category B: Expansions, Upgrades and Pro-
jects Having Limited Environmental Impact [requires submission of environmental information suffi-
cient to establish whether or not the project meets relevant host-country environmental guidelines and 
applicable international guidelines], Category C:  Categorical Exclusions [no further environmental in-
formation is required because the project has minimal environmental impact], at 
http://www.exim.gov/products/policies/environment/envproc.html (categories revised July 1, 2004 to be 
consistent with OECD Common Approaches.) 
 65. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, supra note 53 at 4. 
 66. Nicholas Hildyard, Snouts in the Trough: Export Credit Agencies, Corporate Welfare and Policy 
Incoherence, ECA Watch, at http://www.eca-watch.org/eca/snouts4.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005). 
 67. Campaign Goals, ECA Watch, at http://www.eca-watch.org/goals/index.html (last visited Jan. 
24, 2004). The clearest statement of the NGOs’ position was the Jakarta Declaration for Reform of Of-
ficial Export Credit and Investment Insurance Agencies issued in May, 2000.  See supra, note 52.  Based 
on the experiences of Indonesia and other developing country hosts of ECA-backed projects, the Ja-
karta Declaration called for the development of “binding common environmental and social guidelines 
and standards no lower and/or less rigorous than existing international procedures and standards . . . 
coherent with . . . the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity.”  Id. 
 68. The Action Statement declared: 
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Following intensive negotiations, the ECG produced a draft “Recommenda-
tion on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export 
Credits.”  Known as “The Sixth Revision of the draft Common Approaches,” it 
called on ECAs to screen and classify projects in sensitive areas for potential 
environmental impacts, conduct an environmental review (and, where needed, 
a more comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessment), evaluate and dis-
close the information from the review, and, finally, report and monitor their ex-
periences at the national level. 69  When it came time for adoption, both Turkey 
and the United States objected to the draft.  Turkey based its objection on con-
cerns over language that might address their treatment of the Kurds; the United 
States held out for a stronger text that more closely resembled its domestic laws.  
Lacking consensus approval, the Common Approaches were not adopted as a 
Recommendation. 
Despite this failure, OECD Secretary-General Donald J. Johnston lauded 
the Common Approaches as “an important first step,” stating that “the imple-
mentation of this proposal by most members from January 2002 will mean that 
all major exporting countries of the OECD will now be applying environmental 
review mechanisms.  This results in the first common ‘greening’ of export cred-
its and should be seen as a major accomplishment.”70  Surprisingly, even without 
official adoption by the OECD Council, the standards were voluntarily and uni-
 
(1) [Members agree to] continue to develop, within their national systems of official export credit 
support, procedures and methodologies for identifying and assessing the environmental impact 
of projects . . . . 
(2) [Members agree to] continue to monitor and evaluate, over time, their own experiences with 
these procedures and methodologies, as well as their own experiences related to mitigating the 
environmental impact of individual projects, and share these experiences with the other Mem-
bers . . . . 
(3) [Members agree] based on ECAs’ experiences (e.g. with Environmental Information Ex-
changes), to explore ways to synthesize common elements and best practices related to envi-
ronmental review and impact assessment in order to strengthen a framework of common ap-
proaches amongst export credit agencies . . . . 
(4) [Members agree to] exchange views on an informal basis with appropriate stakeholders. 
Export Credits and the Environment: Work-Plan, OECD (Apr. 2000), at http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/7/0,2340,en_2649_34181_1888199_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 69. In summarizing its goals, the Sixth Revision stated that it would 
[p]romote coherence between policies regarding officially supported export credits and poli-
cies for the protection of the environment, including relevant international agreements and 
conventions, thereby contributing towards sustainable development[;] [d]evelop common pro-
cedures and processes relating to the environmental review of projects benefiting from offi-
cially supported export credits, with a view to achieving equivalence among the measures 
taken by the Members and to reducing the potential for trade distortion[;] [and p]romote good 
environmental practice and consistent processes for projects benefiting from officially sup-
ported export credits, with a view to achieving a high level of environmental protection. 
Draft Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export 
Credits: Revision 6, Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees, OECD Doc. 
TD/ECG(2000)11/REV6 (December 14, 2001) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/32/ 
2726700.pdf. 
 70. Statement by the OECD Secretary-General Donald J. Johnson on Export Credits and the 
Environment (Apr. 12, 2001), at http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,2340,en_2649_34181_2675489_ 
1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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laterally incorporated throughout the OECD (including the United States and 
Turkey).  Most members adopted the OECD standards as internal agency pro-
cedures or rules.  From interviews with OECD staff, this appears to be the first 
time that a practice has been adopted throughout the OECD prior to Council 
adoption.  This seems to have occurred due to the combination of strong exter-
nal NGO pressure, the considerable resources expended to develop the Sixth 
Revision, and the near consensus that had been achieved during negotiations. 
Responding to continued NGO and U.S. pressure, the ECG kept negotiat-
ing and finally adopted a revised Recommendation that was fully adopted in 
December 2003, including Turkey and the United States.  Similar to the Export-
Import Bank’s policy, the Recommendation separates projects into categories 
requiring different levels of environmental review.71  This policy sets minimum 
international environmental standards that vary depending on the extent of im-
pact.72  With the most sensitive projects, the OECD advises that an Environ-
mental Impact Statement be prepared and remain available for thirty calendar 
days before final commitment.  The OECD Common Approaches also require 
transparency during the review process and public notice for consultation with 
affected groups.  Despite a proposal from Japan for an accountability mecha-
nism (and models in the World Bank Inspection Panel and the MNE Guide-
lines’ National Contact Points), the ECG chose not to include a review mecha-
nism or sanction process.  In their place, members submit annual progress 
reports to the Working Group.  ECAs must provide notification details of re-
views of sensitive projects, and it is hoped that peer pressure will be enough to 
ensure compliance. 
The Common Approaches seem to have been adopted domestically as an 
internal agency policy or procedure rather than through statute.  The United 
States signed the 2003 Recommendation and may need to make some small 
modifications to the Export-Import Bank’s guidelines (which already are re-
newed on a regular schedule).  Since the Common Approach creates a floor 
rather than a ceiling and leaves flexibility for national adoption, there has been 
a wide range of implementation, with Austria and Germany essentially adopt-
ing the Common Approach (that is, no complaint or accountability mechanism) 
and the United Kingdom, theUnited States, Canada, and Japan going beyond 
the minimal standards. 
 
 71. See Recommendation on Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Ex-
port Credits, OECD Doc., II, para. 4-6 (2003) (including in Category A any project that has the poten-
tial to create significantly adverse environmental impacts and including all projects in “sensitive areas” 
[as listed by Annex I], in Category B any project where the potential environmental impacts are less 
adverse than those of Category A and where mitigation is available and the effects are reversible, and 
in Category C any project that has minimal to no likely environmental impact), at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/33/21684464.pdf. 
 72. For instance, a Category A project requires an Environmental Impact Assessment that includes 
an “executive summary; policy, legal and administrative framework; project description; baseline data 
(involving the existing environmental conditions); environmental impacts; analysis of alternatives; envi-
ronmental management plan; and record of consultation.”  This is based on the World Bank’s Opera-
tional Manual.  Id. at Annex II. 
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The transparency and responsiveness of the process offers a fascinating in-
sight into how things have changed at the OECD since the MAI experience.  
Negotiations over the Common Approaches followed directly on the heels of 
the MAI debacle but, at first glance, seemed to take little heed of the experi-
ence.  If anything, the process seemed more closed than the MAI negotiations.  
Only representatives of ECAs sat at the table, and all documents were re-
stricted.  The only formal engagement with non-state actors was through peri-
odic information meetings.  Indeed, the only way the OECD environment se-
cretariat was able to influence the proceedings was by sending draft restricted 
papers to Environmental Policy Committee delegates, who then sent them on to 
their national environmental agencies to influence development of domestic 
negotiating positions.  In the negotiations following the Sixth Revision in 2001, 
a number of member states opposed sharing any documents with NGOs and, 
interestingly, no country delegation included NGO representatives. 
Thus far, the process seemed identical to the MAI (and the way prior nego-
tiations had occurred), yet NGOs exerted considerable influence on the Com-
mon Approaches process.  How did this happen?  Part of the answer lies in out-
side pressure.  Groups such as ECA Watch were created explicitly to influence 
the Common Approach negotiations.  Unlike the MAI experience, NGOs were 
aware from the outset of what was happening and created institutional mecha-
nisms to stay engaged and to push for stringent standards.  Interviews with the 
OECD secretariat staff indicate they were well aware of this outside scrutiny.73  
Early on, the secretariat made it clear to member states that it was not the 
OECD’s job to perform civil society consultations.  The OECD effectively told 
NGOs that they needed to work to influence the process at their national capi-
tals, and told member states that engagement with civil society would not be oc-
curring at the OECD.  Importantly, member states and NGOs responded.  
Many countries held formal stakeholder consultations several months prior to 
OECD negotiations in the fall of 2003.  Japan had three weeks of open meet-
ings with NGOs and the business community.  France had a full day consulta-
tion, and the E.U., Germany, and Switzerland held meetings over the summer, 
as well.  In addition, during negotiations countries would be saying, “This is un-
sellable at home to the government and NGOs.”74  Such statements, the OECD 
secretariat staff suggested, never would have been made prior to the MAI ex-
perience.  When an information meeting was held just prior to formal negotia-
tions in November, NGO and business groups made very specific comments 
that clearly were based on the (supposedly restricted) Chairman’s draft.  One 
can only conclude they were provided the draft by the member states. 
The story of NGO influence and criticism of the Common Approaches is 
not over.  ECA Watch argues that the Recommendation “perpetuates the 
ECAs’ race to the bottom” by not requiring “ECAs to apply any specific mini-
 
 73. Interview with OECD personnel secretariat in Paris, France (July 2003). 
 74. Interview with OECD secretariat in Paris, France (July 2003). 
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mum set of [international standards] to projects, [and] deferring rather to a 
broad list of varying standards which they can elect to apply, or not, at will.”75  
ECA Watch has not been entirely negative, however, describing the Recom-
mendation as both an “opportunity and a threat . . . [because] for a number of 
European ECAs, it will mean becoming much more transparent and finally 
joining the modern world of international norms, while others may use it as an 
excuse to move back into the stone age.”  Thus, interestingly, while ECA Watch 
and its member organizations continue to monitor the negotiations leading to 
revision of the Common Approaches and criticize the substance of the Recom-
mendation, they have not criticized the administrative process of negotiating the 
Common Approaches.76 
D. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
Following revelations in the early 1970s of wide-scale unethical and illegal 
activities by multinational enterprises (MNEs), the U.N., ILO, OECD and na-
tional governments focused on means to influence their behavior.77 The U.N. 
General Assembly adopted a consensus resolution on measures against corrupt 
transnational practices, but failed to follow up with a stronger legal instrument.  
One year later, in 1976, the OECD Council of Ministers adopted a recommen-
dation entitled the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises.78 
As its name suggests, the overriding purpose of the Declaration was to pro-
mote transnational investment.  In its introduction and seven chapters, the Dec-
laration and its accompanying Guidelines covered a wide breadth of issues gov-
erning investments.  The separate chapters ranged from topics such as 
information disclosure, competition, and financing, to taxation, science and 
technology, but the requirements were voluntary, vague and hortatory.  The 
Guidelines were necessary to promote investment, it was argued, in order “to 
prevent misunderstandings and build an atmosphere of confidence and predict-
ability between business, labour and governments.”79  The Guidelines, it was 
 
 75. Press Release, ECA Watch, Groups blast weak OECD agreement on environment: Loopholes 
allow export credit support for harmful projects to continue (Dec. 11, 2003), at http://www.eca-
watch.org/press/PressReleaseOECDDecember11.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2005). 
 76. Id.; see, e.g., ECA Watch, What’s New! Vol. 4, No. 2 at § 13 (Feb. 2005), at http://www.eca-
watch.org/WhatsNew/WNV4_2005/WhatsNewV4N2.html (demonstrating that ECA Watch continues 
to follow developments at the OECD). 
 77. The best known examples during this period were the involvement of ITT and other U.S. com-
panies in the 1973 Chilean coup that overthrew president Allende and the series of bribes paid by 
Lockheed to Japanese politicians for military contracts. 
 78. Declaration on Int’l Investment and Multinational Enterprises, in Declarations and Decisions on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Basic Texts, OECD Doc. 
DAFFE/IME(2000)20, 5-6 (June 21, 1976), revised June 27, 2000, at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/ 
2000doc.nsf/4f7adc214b9a685c12569fa005d0ee7/c125692700623b74c1256991003b5147/SFILE/00085743.
pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2005). 
 79. http://www.oecd.org/documentprint/0,2744,en_2649_34889_2349370_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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hoped, would ensure the operation of MNEs was compatible with the expecta-
tions of the host country by establishing a baseline of rights. 
The chapter on competition, for example, encourages MNEs to refrain from 
entering into or carrying out anti-competitive agreements among competitors, 
to fix prices, make rigged bids, establish output restrictions or quotas, or share 
or divide markets.”80  The chapter on employment and industrial relations was 
equally regarded with great hope when it was included in the final Declaration.  
Supported by both TUAC and BIAC—both sides of the bargaining table—it set 
forth labor rights of union representation, collective bargaining, meaningful en-
gagement with management, and non-discrimination.81 
Until revisions in 2000, implementation of the Guidelines commenced at the 
National Contact Points within national governments.  National Contact Points 
(NCPs) serve as the initial stage of consideration for issues and conflicts arising 
under the Guidelines.  Any party, including BIAC, TUAC, and member coun-
tries, who believe the Guidelines have been violated can request consultations 
with the Contact Points.  If the discussions at this level do not resolve the issue 
between the parties, it can be passed to the OECD’s Committee on Interna-
tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises (CIME, pronounced as “see-
may”).  CIME (located within the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enter-
prise Affairs) was ultimately responsible for adjudication and development of 
the Guidelines.  In response to disputes passed up by the National Contact 
Points, CIME responded by clarifying or interpreting specific language.  This 
process of interpretation involved discussion within CIME as well as consulta-
tions with BIAC and TUAC.  All CIME decisions required consensus among 
the member countries. 
Dispute resolution under the Guidelines was not modeled on a traditional 
judicial model, for CIME’s decisions had no retrospective applicability.  Indeed, 
since the Guidelines were adopted as recommendations, they could not be 
 
 80. Guidelines, supra note 78, Chapter IX. 
 81. The Guidelines called on MNEs to 
§ respect the right of their employees to be represented by trade unions and other 
bona fide organisations and engage in constructive negotiations with them on em-
ployment conditions; 
§ provide assistance and information to employee representatives; 
§ provide information for a true and fair view of the performance of the enterprise; 
§ observe standards of employment and industrial relations not less favorable than 
those observed by comparable employers in the host country; 
§ utilize, train and prepare for upgrading their labor force; 
§ provide reasonable prior notice of changes in operations, in particular on intended 
closures and collective layoffs; 
§ refrain from discriminatory practices in their employment policies; 
§ not exercise unfair influence over bona fide negotiations with employee’s represen-
tatives; 
§ enable authorized representatives of their employees to conduct negotiations on col-
lective bargaining or labor-management relations with management representatives 
authorised to take decisions on the matters at hand. 
Id. at 13-14. 
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treated as binding standards.  Perhaps surprisingly, given the formality of the 
process, CIME did not even make a judgment on the behavior of the companies 
in question.  Instead it used the case to clarify the meaning of how a provision in 
the Guidelines should be applied in future cases.  In a legislative context, the 
closest analogy to this practice would be if Congress continued creating legisla-
tive history after its passage of a statute.  The logic behind this system is similar 
to that of the common law’s clarification of doctrine in specific applications.  
Unlike the common law analog, however, CIME’s interpretations were never 
binding once established and resulted in no penalties for violations. 
Following the Guidelines’ adoption in 1976, TUAC actively sought interpre-
tation of the Employment and Industrial Relations Guidelines and brought a 
slew of cases resulting in over forty decisions by the end of the 1980s.  TUAC’s 
clear goal was to influence both MNE behavior and national laws.  Although 
the results of these cases and others led to CIME decisions clearly promoting 
labor rights,82 these decisions largely fell on deaf ears at the national level. 
Given that the Guidelines provided no binding retrospective or prospective ap-
plication and carried no sanctions in the case of violations, the lack of domestic 
response is unsurprising.  Realizing the decisions were having little influence on 
government or MNE behavior, TUAC become less involved, bringing only four 
labor cases during the 1990s. 
The Guidelines have been amended four times—in 1979, 1984, 1991, and 
2000.  In 1991 a new chapter was added on the environment.  The most recent 
revisions, approved on June 27, 2000, were the result of lengthy consultations 
with a wide range of non-state actors and led to dramatic changes.  No longer 
simply a clearinghouse for CIME, the NCPs were overhauled in the revisions to 
become active investigating and settlement authorities.  Anyone may forward a 
complaint (known as a “specific instance”) to the NCP, and the specific instance 
need not have occurred in the member state (that is, the Guidelines now apply 
to the global operations of MNEs based in adhering countries).  Thus, for ex-
ample, a Venezuelan-based subsidiary of an American MNE would be covered 
by the Guidelines.83  The NCP then investigates the details, decides whether the 
Guidelines have been violated and issues a report that names the company. 
The NCPs’ new role has been described by the OECD secretariat as a “soft 
whistle-blowing facility.”84  In the United States, the NCP is located in the State 
Department.  The Australian NCP is in the Ministry of the Treasury, while 
 
 82. For case summaries, see Christopher R. Coxson, The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work: Promoting Labor Law Reforms Through the ILO as an Alternative to 
Imposing Coercive Trade Sanctions, 17 DICK. J. INT’L L. 469 (1999); see also INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA ON LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOLUME 6 (Roger Blanpain ed., 
1985). 
 83. Although Venezuela would not have a National Contact Point in its government, the Proce-
dural Guidance annex to the Council Decision on the Guidelines provides advice and guidance for the 
U.S. National Contact Point to follow in case of challenges in non-adhering countries. The actual cov-
erage of the Guidelines could be larger still, since the General Policies chapter mentions sub-
contractors and suppliers of MNEs.  See Guidelines, supra note 78 at Chapter II(10). 
 84. Interview with OECD secretariat in Paris, France (July 2003). 
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Norway and several other countries have a tripartite NCP, including the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs and Industry. Compared to the pre-2000 Guidelines, the 
more substantive Revisions have been extremely successful.  As of December, 
2003, the Guidelines had been adopted by thirty-seven countries, and sixty-four 
specific instances had been filed in twenty-one countries.85  Unlike the frustrat-
ing experience of toothless CIME decisions prior to the 2000 revisions, parties 
clearly believe that the potential benefits of bringing specific instances today are 
worth the expense. 
A recent specific instance in Sweden illustrates how the revised Guidelines 
work in practice.  The NCP in Sweden is administered by three ministries—
Industry, Justice, and Environment.  In 2002, Friends of the Earth and 
ATTACK filed a specific instance against two Swedish companies’ operations 
at the Ashanti Goldfields in Ghana.  The letter launching the specific instance 
was accompanied by documentation alleging violations of the Guidelines.  The 
NCP held meetings with the NGOs and the companies, visited the site, and re-
quested the Swedish embassy in Ghana to investigate the allegations.  In its re-
port, the NCP concluded that the companies were too far removed from the 
mine operations to be held responsible under the Guidelines.  The report’s pub-
lication was accompanied by a press release.86  In another example, the Korean 
NCP investigated a specific instance in Sri Lanka of a Sri Lankan/Korean joint 
venture (half owned by the Korean company), 
which fired four workers for their union organization activities. Although the joint 
venture contract states that the Sri Lankan partner is in charge of labor-management, 
the Korean NCP recommended that the Korean company share “the responsibility as 
co-manager” and that the company “conform to the OECD Guidelines and resolve its 
labor disputes. 87 
In contrast to the process prior to the 2000 revisions, NCP action ended the 
matter and CIME was not involved.  Indeed, it is now expected that CIME will 
become involved only in the case of failure, when the national NCP is unable to 
resolve the issue.  Indeed, of the over sixty cases since the revisions, only one 
has gone beyond the NCP to CIME.  Instead, CIME now serves in largely an 
oversight capacity, following up with NCPs that have not reported their activi-
ties (another example of using peer pressure to promote compliance) and clari-
fying aspects of the Guidelines.  In this role, CIME is assisted by BIAC and 
TUAC, which can request clarifications or interpretations of the text and pro-
cedural guidance.  NGOs have a voice in this process through OECD-Watch, an 
NGO umbrella group created for this purpose. 
The “Procedural Guidance” establishing the NCPs states that “NCPs will 
operate in accordance with core criteria of visibility, transparency, accessibility, 
transparency and accountability to further the objective of functional equiva-
 
 85. Approximately two-thirds of the specific instances concerned company operations in non-
adhering countries. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: 2003 Annual Meeting of the Na-
tional Contact Points, Report by the Chair at 9, at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/47/15941397.pdf. 
 86. Id. at 10-11. 
 87. Id. at 10. 
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lence.”88  In practice, approaches to transparency have varied significantly as 
NCPs seek to find the appropriate balance between confidentiality and open-
ness.89  NCPs are also struggling to define their role in relation to more formal 
judicial processes.  Ten of the twelve most active NCPs, for example, reported 
that “at least one of their specific instances involved business conduct covered 
by host country laws, regulations or administrative procedures. . . [and that] it is 
quite common to use the specific instance procedure in parallel with legal regu-
latory or administrative procedures.”90 
The revised content of the Guidelines in 2000 was not the only change of 
importance.  From an institutional perspective, perhaps far more important was 
the revision process.  Reflecting lessons from the MAI experience, the revision 
process was much more inclusive than ever before.  Breaking from tradition, for 
the first time CIME created a truly public consultation process, actively seeking 
input from both outside the OECD and inside (from the Environment Direc-
torate, for example, and from the OECD Working Party on Bribery and Cor-
ruption).  The Chair of the OECD Working Party on the Review, Marinus Sik-
kel of the Netherlands, convened an informal consultation group of TUAC, 
BIAC and selected NGOs.  Known as the Hague Process, Sikkel invited these 
groups to a brainstorming meeting in the Hague with the understanding that the 
participants spoke in a personal capacity.  Before each subsequent meeting the 
group was given a draft of a paper prepared by Sikkel and OECD staff (but 
which had not yet been sent to governments).  The last meeting in Amsterdam 
was expanded to include three members from TUAC, three from BIAC, three 
NGOs, Sikkel, and OECD secretariat staff, and government representatives 
from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Mexico.  The Hague Process 
operated in many respects like a focus group.  The members had no mandate to 
bind their organizations, but their reactions and creative drafting provided in-
sights (and perhaps a buy-in) that would not otherwise have been apparent. 
This draft then fed into a process that resembled notice-and-comment rule-
making.  The OECD posted the draft text of the Guidelines on the web and in-
 
 88. 2003 Annual Meeting,  supra note 85, at 12-13. 
 89. The 2003 Annual Review notes, for example, that practices differ widely in relation to 
informing parties of the progress in handling specific instances, provision of information to 
non parties, publication of the fact that a specific instance has been raised, making statements 
while the specific instance is being considered, publication of the reasons for not agreeing to 
consider a specific instance, and the naming of parties to a specific instance. 
Id. at 14. 
 90. Id. at 14-15.  The 2003 Annual Review notes that 
NCPs differed in their response as to whether the fact that a specific instance concerned busi-
ness conduct covered by legal, regulatory or administrative procedures would influence their 
approach to a specific instance.  Nine experienced NCPs felt that if could or has already influ-
enced decisions.  For example, one experienced NCP was confronted with a specific instance 
that concerned business conduct that was also the subject of legal proceedings.  In this situa-
tion, the NCP felt it could not proceed in dealing with the specific instance.  Another experi-
enced NCP felt that national legal, regulatory or administrative procedures would not affect 
their decision. 
Id. at 33. 
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vited public comments.  Comments were sent by businesses, labor unions, envi-
ronmental groups, academic institutions, individuals, and non-member coun-
tries, and these, too, were posted on the web for all to see.  A second draft text, 
influenced by these comments, was posted and subject to a similar round of 
public comment.91 
Although not surprising to those familiar with national administrative rule-
making procedures, this was unprecedented at the OECD.  While secretariat 
staff who works with the Guidelines regard it as a great success, it is interesting 
to note that this process was not followed during development of the Common 
Approaches to Export Credits described in the preceding case study. 
IV 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AT THE OECD 
These case studies provide empirical evidence to understand the role and 
development of administrative law at the OECD.  In the context of global ad-
ministrative law—the administrative law of international organizations—the 
OECD offers two important insights.  The first concerns whether administrative 
law should apply to important OECD activities that are not traditionally con-
sidered lawmaking.  The second explains why the OECD has adopted a decen-
tralized model of administrative law. 
A. Administrative Law for “Not Yet Law” 
In the little that has been written on the OECD, it is often held up as a 
prime example of an organization that operates on the basis of cooperation and 
informal networks, relying on “soft law”—recommendations and guidelines—
rather than hard rules.  Anne-Marie Slaughter, for example, has described the 
OECD as a model for future international organizations, focusing on its ability 
to bring together many constituent interests for “transnational problem solv-
ing.”92  Her assessment rests on the growth of what she calls “transgovernmen-
talism”—cooperative problem-solving by global networks of subparts of the na-
tion state.  “These parts,” Slaughter argues, “are networking with their 
counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, 
transgovernmental order . . . .  [T]ransgovernmentalism is rapidly becoming the 
most widespread and effective mode of international governance.”93  By provid-
ing a forum for government officials and nongovernmental experts to meet and 
share research and experiences on cutting-edge policy issues, the OECD can 
frame the issues for future collective consideration, lay the groundwork for 
 
 91. CIME also formally invited the ILO to all Working Party meetings. See 
http://www1.oecd.org/media/release/nw00-27a.html. 
 92. Slaughter, supra note 13, at 196. 
 93. Id. at 184-85. 
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agreement, and identify who shall provide the influential voices in the policy 
debate.94 
Dick Stewart has described such activities of coordination and standard set-
ting as “horizontal arrangements” of administrative law that 
involve informal cooperation among national regulatory officials to coordinate poli-
cies and enforcement practices in areas such as antitrust, telecommunications, chemi-
cals regulation, and transportation safety. Such coordination helps to reduce barriers 
to trade and commerce created by differing national regulations and to address trans-
national regulatory problems that exceed purely domestic capabilities.95 
Recall that the OECD’s committees, working groups, expert groups and 
conferences bring together approximately 40,000 government officials and ex-
perts annually.96  Apart from setting standards (such as the Test Guidelines) 
and negotiating Recommendations and Decisions, some of these gatherings in-
evitably coalesce into a core of identifiable groups of experts that influence the 
delineation of policy challenges and strategic analysis of how they should be re-
solved.97  These actions operate below the radar screen of what we normally 
consider to be “lawmaking” activities but may significantly influence agency ac-
tivities.  As Stewart notes, a horizontal network of agency officials 
may agree informally to a common regulatory policy that is subsequently implemented 
domestically by participating U.S. regulators through rulemaking or enforcement ac-
tions.  While these domestic implementing decisions are subject to U.S. administrative 
law procedures and judicial review, the underlying policy was adopted through ex-
tranational processes that are not. Moreover, in some cases there may be no formal 
domestic decision at all, but merely administrative exercise of discretion—for exam-
ple, a decision not to enforce U.S. requirements against imported products because of 
 
 94. “International organizations provide the physical contact and aura of legitimacy that translate 
some of these potential transgovernmental coalitions into active ones. . . .  These coalitions form not 
only through contacts in the countries but sometimes through an active role by secretariat officials.”  
Krause and Nye, supra note 5, at 337-38.  Although an epistemic community need not be linked with a 
specific IGO or necessarily include government officials, this is often the case.  See generally Peter M. 
Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1 
(1992). 
 95. Richard B. Stewart, Essay: Administrative Law In The Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
437, 455 (2003).  This is reinforced by the observation of Krause and Nye that “With the growth of eco-
nomic interdependence, more bureaucracies that were once considered domestic become involved in 
international affairs.  Many bureaucracies and agencies of governments have similar interests.  In some 
cases, the similarity of interests is greater across national lines than it is with competing domestic agencies 
and interests.” Krause and Nye, supra note 5, at 337 (emphasis added). 
 96. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/33/34011915.pdf. 
 97. The influence can be indirect, as well: 
As such practices [that is, patterns of regularized policy coordination] become widespread, 
transgovernmental elite networks are created, linking officials in various governments to one 
another by ties of common interest, professional orientation, and personal friendship.  Even 
where attitudes are not fundamentally affected and no major deviations from central policy 
positions occur, the existence of a sense of collegiality may permit the development of flexible 
bargaining behavior in which concessions need not be requited issue by issue or during each 
period. 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 
27 WORLD POLITICS 39, 46 (1974).  This observation is equally true for nongovernmental officials. 
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a prior informal agreement on functional equivalence or mutual recognition of regula-
tory standards. 98 
One could make a few word changes in this quote and it would describe ex-
actly the Sixth Revision of the Common Approaches to Export Credits—an 
OECD agreement that was never formally approved by Council yet was 
adopted throughout the OECD.  And this can happen quite often because of 
the OECD’s inherent flexibility.  Since its work program is decided by the 
member countries, it can transform its organizational dividing lines, procedures, 
and priorities in line with changing governmental concerns over complex, multi-
lateral issues that require information creation and dissemination (such as labor 
standards and trade flows).99 
And what about activities even farther removed from lawmaking?  The 
OECD’s importance as an international organization rests foremost on its tech-
nical expertise.  It is best known for its research activities.  While the OECD 
creates standards and, on rare occasions, makes law, most of the time it shapes 
ideas and marshals facts operating as a powerful consulting firm.  These re-
search activities have important impacts beyond the marshalling of information.  
In bringing experts together, the OECD creates international networks.  In the 
role of transgovernmental problem-identifier and -solver, the OECD has the 
ability in some instances to create the debate and in many instances to channel 
the debate, fixing the contours of discussion over what is desirable and what is 
possible.100  The net effect can be a subtle but significant form of advocacy.  As 
David Trubek has observed, the result is an “organization built around the idea 
of technical expertise that has had to confront the fact that the technical is the 
political. . . .  It could be argued that this work is as, if not more, important than 
the more formal law making.”101  Yet beyond derestriction requirements prior 
to publication of OECD documents, there are no formal administrative proce-
dures for research activities. 
Consideration of the OECD’s different forms of influence leads us to con-
sider which, if any, administrative procedures and safeguards are appropriate 
for activities that influence and shape rules, but are not rulemaking processes.  
Put another way, for some international organizations, such as the WTO and 
E.U., we care about their administrative law because actions taken by these or-
ganizations can have regulatory-like effect in nation-states while supplanting 
domestic administrative law safeguards.  But this does not seem to be the case 
for most of the OECD’s activities, which fall more comfortably in the “not yet 
law” category. 
 
 98. Stewart, supra note 95, at 456. 
 99. Of course, this also means that certain issues are not addressed, or are possibly avoided.  For 
example, the ELSA Committee has not considered issues of female and child labor as seriously as at 
the World Bank, or labor market flexibility as seriously as at the International Labor Organization. 
 100. Keohane and Nye, supra note 97, at 53-54. 
 101. Comments from David Trubek to James Salzman,  Comments on Salzman’s OECD Chapter – 
2/17/04, prepared for NYU workshop (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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Instead, perhaps we should be more concerned over the interplay between 
domestic administrative law procedures and actions at IGOs that we tend not to 
think of as lawmaking, but that influence agency action.  There are already pro-
cedures in place at the OECD to ensure accuracy of information, but Trubek, 
among others clearly has more in mind.  Even if one ignores the OECD’s occa-
sional role as lawmaker and standard-setter, its activities as a transgovernmen-
tal actor and knowledge-creator make it an important power center.  Serious 
consideration of global administrative law therefore must also examine the 
outer limits of administrative process in the international arena. 
Put most broadly, then, how should the administrative safeguards of trans-
parency, responsiveness, and accountability apply to the knowledge-creation 
and management of informal horizontal networks in international organiza-
tions?  One could imagine administrative procedures that increased the trans-
parency of the OECD’s choice of outside experts to draft reports—experts who 
commented on the reports, whether an adequate range of views has been con-
sidered or reflected in the research, or, indeed, how the research topic was cho-
sen.  Arguments for such procedures are premised on the insight that research 
both is political and has political implications that can affect domestic agency 
activities.  One needs to be careful, however, that procedural safeguards do not 
overburden the exchange of ideas and information.  After all, it may well be the 
very lack of safeguards and the friction they would create to the exchange of 
ideas that makes such networks effective in the first place.  Nor is it clear what 
type of procedural safeguards would be appropriate.  Unlike the definite and 
discrete character of notice-and-comment rulemaking, for example, knowledge 
creation and networking are, by definition, expansive, organic, and dynamic en-
deavors.  A fruitful avenue for future research might therefore examine how 
administrative law addresses information gathering and networking activities at 
the domestic level, and assess whether these practices would be appropriate at 
the international level.  This issue is difficult but important, and deserves closer 
consideration. 
B. The Evolution of Decentralized Administrative Law at the OECD 
In assessing the role of administrative procedures and safeguards at the 
OECD, one must keep in mind that traditionally these have not been issues that 
anyone cared about.  When I worked at the OECD’s Environment Directorate 
a decade ago, for example, we would sometimes discuss engagement with 
NGOs on specific issues, but the general topic never came up.  That is why the 
MAI experience was such a shock.  It drew the OECD into intense public scru-
tiny and forced staff within the OECD to recognize the importance of including 
civil society.  Not only was the OECD experiencing its first significant public 
criticism, but its procedures were being criticized by NGOs and, subsequently, 
by governments.  Those in the secretariat at the time felt blindsided and blood-
ied.  Thus the MAI story is a cautionary tale—showing how the choice of an 
administrative process contributed to the implosion of the MAI negotiations. 
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In assessing the failure of the MAI negotiations, three basic lessons were 
clear to the OECD secretariat.  First, substance matters.  Although regarded by 
the secretariat as simply a harmonization exercise of existing BITs, the MAI 
would have changed the balance of power in FDI, making it harder for host 
countries to restrict foreign investment activities.  This was why efforts to ad-
dress investment had failed in the Uruguay Round.  Second, membership mat-
ters.  The failure to negotiate an investment agreement for the world during the 
Uruguay Round led some proponents, particularly the United States and 
France, to seek a more welcoming forum.  The like-minded, wealthy nations of 
the OECD emerged as an obvious candidate for such a “build it and they will 
come” strategy of treaty negotiation.  Third and most important, the adminis-
trative process matters.  The traditional closed-door approach of the OECD 
during the negotiations and lack of meaningful engagement with civil society 
engendered suspicion and made the OECD an easy target because it could not 
defend itself by revealing what was actually happening around the table.102  If 
the OECD was not conscious of civil society’s power before the MAI, it cer-
tainly was afterwards.  What makes the subsequent case studies so interesting is 
that they demonstrate very different reactions to these lessons. 
At first glance, the development of the Common Approaches on Export 
Credits seems to have gained nothing from the MAI experience.  The MAI and 
Common Approaches negotiations looked nearly identical.  Negotiations took 
place behind closed doors.  Documents were restricted.  Meetings with civil so-
ciety were infrequent and more in the manner of information dissemination 
than discussion.  Perhaps this should have been expected, for the Common Ap-
proaches negotiations involved national civil servants in many cases from the 
same ministries as the MAI. 
In looking deeper, though, the MAI debacle did sensitize the OECD to ad-
ministrative law values, for a fundamental shift had taken place by the time the 
Common Approaches negotiation got serious.  In early discussions, OECD staff 
made it clear to member states not only that consultations with civil society 
needed to take place (which was unusual in itself) but, more fundamentally, 
that responsibility for engagement lay first with the member states, not with the 
OECD.  Although consultation burdens were formally shared by the OECD 
and member states both in Paris and in the national capitals, the net result ef-
fectively delegated most of the consultation and transparency responsibilities to 
the member states.  This transformed what would otherwise have been a solely 
international negotiation among like-minded agencies into a broader discussion 
with non-state input. 
This could not have been a greater contrast to the revision of the MNE 
Guidelines, taking place at the same time.  For all effective purposes, this was 
about as close to notice-and-comment rulemaking as one can get in the interna-
 
 102. It is not at all clear that different administrative law procedures have led to a successful MAI 
negotiation, given the substantive disagreements over the text, but the administrative process certainly 
helped fan the public outrage over the negotiations that ultimately doomed them. 
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tional arena.  A representative focus group tackled the issues informally, ham-
mering out a draft that was then widely disseminated with a request for com-
ments.  The revised version was then publicly posted again.  And make no mis-
take, the Guidelines involved a lot more sectors of civil society than the 
Common Approaches.  The member states negotiating the Common Ap-
proaches knew of the Guidelines’ revision process but chose not to follow it. 
Perhaps most interesting in terms of institutional learning, the most success-
ful and effective process for civil society engagement, the MAD system, has not 
been copied anywhere else in the OECD.  The process of creating a role for the 
formal engagement of non-state experts, routinely open meetings, and dere-
stricted documents stands in stark contrast to the MAI and Common Ap-
proaches processes.  Yet these procedures have not been followed by other 
OECD negotiations.  Perhaps the technical complexity of standard setting 
makes this a difficult model to adopt elsewhere, but surely the guiding princi-
ples of transparency and peer review are transferable. 
Taken together, these observations suggest that the OECD does not have 
“an administrative law” for the organization.  Indeed, the decision seems to 
have been made at the highest levels of the OECD not to establish an organiza-
tion-wide set of principles, rules, and processes concerning the transparency, ac-
countability, and engagement of OECD activities.  As the case studies demon-
strate, these vary enormously throughout the organization.  In fact, in 
contrasting the cases of the MAD system, the Common Approaches and the 
MNE Guidelines, it would be hard to come up with three more distinct methods 
of addressing transparency, responsiveness, and accountability.  This all could 
have changed after the MAI saga, but the OECD Council chose to retain the 
organization’s decentralized manner of operations, effectively rejecting the top-
down Operational Directive approach of the World Bank.  In practice, this has 
meant leaving it up to each Directorate (indeed to each division) how best to 
ensure administrative process safeguards. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The obvious question that follows is why there are such radically different 
administrative processes at work within the same organization.  There are at 
least three explanations worth considering.  The first rests in the dynamic of 
credibility and effectiveness.  In other words, for the Common Approaches to 
work, the OECD Recommendation needs to be adopted by the national ECAs.  
In terms of lobbying and politics, it would be nice if non-state actors supported 
the final result, but this is by no means necessary.  For the Guidelines to work, 
by contrast, civil society must be willing to file specific instances.  They have to 
accept both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the process.  Otherwise the 
NCPs will become dormant, as occurred in the 1990s when labor groups real-
ized the CIME decisions were impotent.  Similarly, while the MAD system ul-
timately depends only on the acceptance of test results by national agencies, the 
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credibility of the system rests firmly on its acceptance by industry and NGOs.  
There are few places in the world where animal welfare activists and chemical 
company toxicologists sit at the same table and seriously work together. 
The second reason there is not a uniform administrative law in the OECD 
lies in membership—not national membership, but directorate membership.  
Each directorate’s choice of process for working with civil society depends on 
what is deemed necessary for credibility and effectiveness in a particular setting.  
Or, to put it more accurately, the member state delegates in each directorate 
have different priorities and manners of operation, indeed different worldviews.  
It is not surprising that the most open and responsive of all the case study proc-
esses analyzed, the MAD system, is run by a part of the organization, the Envi-
ronment Directorate, with the most experience in working with NGOs.  After 
all, the member state delegates making decisions in the Environment Director-
ate already have extensive experience interacting with NGOs in their own coun-
tries on a regular basis.  The MAI and Common Approaches, by contrast, were 
negotiated and directed by officials from treasury ministries—agencies hardly 
known for their efforts to engage civil society at a domestic level.  So why would 
one expect anything different when the same people are operating at the inter-
national level?  This explanation suggests that national delegates seek to repro-
duce familiar institutions and processes at the OECD. 
The effect of the directorate’s relative familiarity with NGOs also sheds 
light on a common issue in other international organizations—the relative in-
fluence of secretariats versus government representatives in determining admin-
istrative procedures.103  From the cases studied, the OECD secretariat seems to 
play a relatively minor role in determining institutional processes.  Yet given 
the traditional role of the OECD, the power of government delegates is not 
surprising.  Perhaps more than any other IGO, the OECD is a member-state-
driven organization, prioritizing its work program every year based on a vote of 
member state preferences and working toward consensus in its day-to-day ac-
tivities. 
The third explanation for the OECD’s flexible approach relies on path de-
pendence.  The OECD has multiple administrative law processes because its 
growth has been organic, extending into areas in which administrative proce-
dures are needed in an opportunistic rather than a planned manner.  There was 
not an organization-wide administrative law at the time of the organization’s 
creation because none was necessary for implementing the Marshall Plan.  As 
the organization grew, creating new directorates to address fields of interest to 
member states, the organization remained decentralized.  Much as America’s 
 
 103. Benedict Kingsbury has described the question as 
whether the operation of OECD regulatory processes is the direct expression of the common 
sensibility of national government delegates in their network . . . or alternatively whether the 
design of these regulatory processes interposes institutional features, e.g., a layer of fairly in-
dependent international bureaucrats between the network and the decisions. 
E-mail from Benedict Kingbury to James Salzman, Conversation with Jim Salzman re Global Ad Law 
paper, September 18, 2003 (on file with author). 
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fifty states have been termed “laboratories of democracy,” free to develop their 
own policies and procedures on matters of local concern, so, too, the OECD 
Council gives great discretion to each directorate to determine how best to run 
its affairs.  The OECD likely will never develop a uniform approach for setting 
standards, negotiating recommendations, or sanctioning noncompliance for the 
simple reason that different directorates have different priorities, constituen-
cies, and manners of dealing with these issues.104 
It is worth remembering, as well, that administrative processes are dynamic.  
The reaction of civil society to OECD administrative law developments has 
been as opportunistic as any initiative within the organization.  Witness the 
creation of OECD-Watch, the group addressing the OECD Guidelines, ECA 
Watch, addressing the ECA negotiations, and ICAPO, addressing the MAD 
process.  These NGOs were created for the sole purpose of engagement with 
the OECD on specific issues, seeking to replicate the influence exercised by the 
more formal TUAC and BIAC for decades.  Administrative law at the OECD 
is thus both decentralized and dynamic, changing issue by issue both within and 
outside the organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 104. Widely different views on the appropriate transparency, responsiveness, and accountability of 
government action are not only held across different ministries but across different governments, as 
well.  Thus the United States holds starkly different views on appropriate administrative safeguards 
compared to Japan, Mexico, or Turkey, yet all are OECD Member states. 
